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ABSTRACT
Recent research has shown that memory illusions can successfully prime both children’s and
adults’ performance on complex, insight-based problems (compound remote associates tasks
or CRATs). The current research aimed to clarify the locus of these priming effects. Like
before, Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists were selected to prime subsequent CRATs
such that the critical lures were also the solution words to a subset of the CRATs participants
attempted to solve. Unique to the present research, recognition memory tests were used and
participants were either primed during the list study phase, during the memory test phase, or
both. Across two experiments, primed problems were solved more frequently and
signiﬁcantly faster than unprimed problems. Moreover, when participants were primed
during the list study phase, subsequent solution times and rates were considerably superior
to those produced by those participants who were simply primed at test. Together, these are
the ﬁrst results to show that false-memory priming during encoding facilitates problem-
solving in both children and adults.
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Memory is renowned for being fallible. Errors of commis-
sion, or falsely “remembering” information that was never
experienced, are among the most frequently encountered
memory problems (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011;
Gallo, 2010; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009;
Roediger, 1996). To study these errors, researchers have
turned to the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) para-
digm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here,
participants are presented with a list of words (e.g., nurse,
medicine, hospital) that are all associates of a nonpresented
but related concept, known as the critical lure (e.g.,
DOCTOR). Research using this paradigm has found that:
(1) in subsequent recall and recognition tests participants
frequently yet incorrectly identify the nonpresented critical
lure as having been present in the previously studied list,
and (2) developmentally, younger children exhibit fewer
false memories compared with older children and adults
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 2011; Gallo, 2010; Howe et al., 2009).
False memory illusions, including those produced by
the DRM paradigm, are frequently viewed as being a nega-
tive consequence of a powerful, reconstructive memory
system. These negative consequences are not simply
limited to misremembering items on lists, but extend to
falsely remembering event-consistent objects or people
that were not present during the original experience. In
extreme examples, people incorrectly recount earlier
experiences as ones that they believed happened (e.g.,
being abducted by a UFO) when in fact no such event
occurred (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade,
2009). Worse, such false memories can have serious per-
sonal costs, as in cases involving false accusations of
sexual assault that lead to the conviction of innocent
people (e.g., Howe, 2013).
However, some recent research has suggested that
there may be more positive consequences of false
memory illusions (e.g., Howe, 2011; Howe & Derbish,
2010). What such studies have found is that false memories
can and do behave in similar ways to true memories. For
example, McDermott (1997) and McKone and Murphy
(2000) showed that false memories generated using the
DRM paradigm could prime performance on related
memory tasks using both implicit (e.g., stem completion)
and explicit (e.g., stem-cued recall) memory measures.
Similar effects with fragment completion have been
obtained with children (Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005). These
parallels prompted researchers to examine the possible
beneﬁcial effects false memories could have on other
memory tasks, with the positive consequences of
memory illusions quickly becoming apparent (for reviews,
see Howe, 2011; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).
Importantly, if false memories have positive conse-
quences similar to those normally ascribed to truememories,
then we should see these consequences across a variety of
cognitive domains and not simply in other memory tasks.
One cognitive domain in which memory processes may
play a key, supporting role is problem-solving. Historically,
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Taylor & Francis.
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the dependence of problem-solving on memory has been
hotly debated (e.g., see Brainerd & Reyna, 1993, for claims
regarding independence, and Howe, Rabinowitz, & Grant,
1993, for an opposing position). The emerging consensus,
however, is that successful problem-solving is crucially
dependent on a range of memory processes, including the
recall of knowledge acquired through instruction and
worked examples (e.g., Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005; Renkl,
2002), the application of a “recognition heuristic” that can
provide valid cues in decision-making (e.g., Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Oppenheimer,
2003), and the transfer of analogous experiences to assist in
attaining current goals (e.g., Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Rich-
land, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007).
Although these latter memory processes appear to rely
largely on direct or explicit retrieval there is also increasing
acknowledgement that memory can inﬂuence problem-
solving and reasoning through intuitive processes operat-
ing indirectly or implicitly (e.g., Evans, 2011; Stanovich,
West, & Toplak, 2011). Such intuitive processes appear to
have their basis either in tacitly learned associations (e.g.,
Osman & Stavy, 2006; Sloman, 1996) or in rules that have
been deliberatively acquired but practiced to a state of
automaticity (e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Research has
also indicated that prior activation of speciﬁc knowledge
structures can prime successful problem-solving through
implicit mechanisms. For example, Kokinov (1990;
Kokinov & Petrov, 2001) showed that priming can facilitate
performance with complex deductive, inductive, and ana-
logical reasoning problems, beneﬁtting both the strategy
taken and the success/failure ratio. Schunn and Dunbar
(1996) corroborated these ﬁndings in an analogical
problem-solving paradigm, demonstrating that conceptual
knowledge of one knowledge domain (biochemistry) can
spontaneously inﬂuence complex reasoning in another,
unrelated knowledge domain (molecular genetics) via
implicit priming, leading to facilitated problem-solving as
measured through both accuracy and speed of solution
generation. Schunn and Dunbar’s sophisticated controls
and measures also allowed the involvement of explicit
memory processes to be ruled out as a cause of solution
success in the priming conditions.
Although previous research has conﬁrmed that true
memories can effectively prime solutions in problem-
solving tasks, the question remains as to whether
memory illusions, which are also a product of our recon-
structive memory system, can likewise prime solutions in
such tasks. That is, because false memories occur with
some regularity, we can ask whether they are just a necess-
ary and epiphenomenal evil that arises because of the
reconstructive nature of remembering the past and
trying to anticipate the future, or can they, like true mem-
ories, serve some ﬁtness-relevant function? Using implicitly
generated information to solve problems is a key feature in
many proposals concerning the nature of creative
problem-solving (Hélie & Sun, 2010) and, of course, false
memories do come under the rubric of information that
is generated automatically, outside of conscious aware-
ness. Indeed, implicit information may have an advantage
over explicitly generated information in terms of threat or
stress (e.g., Porter & Leach, 2009) or when solving complex
problems using “deliberation-without-attention” (Dijkster-
huis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006).
As a ﬁrst approximation to answering this question, we
examined insight-based, creative problem-solving (Howe,
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Garner,
Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010). Such problem-solving is thought
to involve spreading activation processes much like those
that mediate the formation of spontaneous false memories
in the DRM paradigm (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, &
Kounios, 2005; Mednick, 1962). Concerning the latter,
both the associative-activation theory (AAT, Howe et al.,
2009) and the activation-monitoring theory (AMT, Roedi-
ger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) suggest that false memories
are formed due to implicit activation of critical lures upon
presentation of items on the DRM list. Activation from list
members spreads to other lexical items in memory, extend-
ing to the unpresented critical lure as well as to other unpre-
sented items. This activation can reverberate among items
in memory (presented or not) as well as back from these
unpresented items to items that were presented (Anderson
& Lebiere, 1998). Similarly, for insight-based problems,
spreading activation mechanisms can be triggered when
problem solvers encounter a concept (e.g., an item within
an insight-based problem) and this activation assists
problem-solving inasmuch as it provides a preliminary
search through the memory network for related concepts.
This search spreads to both related and unrelated concepts
and continues until those concepts that are crucial to the
problem solution become active and an insightful solution
is achieved (Bowden et al., 2005; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004).
Howe et al. (2010) were the ﬁrst to carry out research
investigating the role that false memories play in priming
insight-based solutions using compound remote associ-
ates tasks (CRATs) (see Mednick, 1962; Sio, Monaghan, &
Ormerod, 2013). CRAT problems, originally developed by
Mednick (1962), involve the presentation of three words
(e.g., apple, family, and house), which can be associated
by a common solution word (e.g., TREE). Howe, Garner,
Dewhurst, et al. (2010) presented adults with DRM lists
whose critical lures served as potential primes for half of
the subsequent CRAT problems that participants had to
solve. They found that when participants falsely recalled
the critical lures of the studied DRM lists, the corresponding
CRATs were solved more frequently and signiﬁcantly faster
than CRATs that had not been primed by DRM lists or
CRATs that were primed but the critical lure had not
been falsely recalled.
Howe et al. (2011) extended this research to children.
They recruited both child (11-year-olds) and adult partici-
pants (18-year-olds) and, using age-normed CRATs, found
that regardless of age, CRATs were solved at a signiﬁcantly
higher rate and more quickly when the critical lures of the
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studied DRM lists had been falsely recalled compared with
instances when the critical lures were not falsely recalled
and instances when the CRATs had not been primed by
prior DRM lists. This research shows that like true mem-
ories, false memories can successfully prime higher order
cognitive tasks (i.e., insight-based problem-solving). More-
over, this research challenges the view that false memory
illusions are inherently maladaptive and, like false beliefs
(McKay & Dennett, 2009), highlights the positive contri-
butions of false memory illusions, namely the assistance
they offer during complex problem-solving.
Because of the robust nature of this effect, it requires an
adequate explanation that includes a clear depiction of the
mechanisms that mediate memory-based priming effects
in creative problem-solving. First, these ﬁndings are impor-
tant in terms of theories of spontaneous false memory for-
mation. Indeed, they are consistent with the false memory
theories mentioned earlier that invoke spreading acti-
vation mechanisms (e.g., AAT, Howe et al., 2009). This is
because false memories that have been activated during
DRM list presentation are still above threshold in memory
when participants are trying to solve CRAT problems.
That is, solving CRATs becomes easier because spread of
activation from the CRAT terms to the critical lure (or
problem solution) is faster given that the critical lure is
already active in memory. Indeed, problem-solving is
dependent on false memory activation levels because sol-
ution times are faster and solution rates higher when par-
ticipants falsely remember the critical lure than when they
do not. Other models of false memory that do not involve
spreading activation mechanisms may have more difﬁculty
accounting for these ﬁndings. For example, fuzzy-trace
theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993) suggests that false
memories rely on the extraction of gist (or meaning)
traces and not on the spread of activation within
memory. Given the absence of contradictory information
(e.g., verbatim traces), items that are consistent with the
extracted gist may be falsely remembered along with actu-
ally presented information during recall or recognition
tests. It is clear that fuzzy-trace theory can account for
the fact that the term SWEET may be falsely remembered
when the DRM list sour, sugar, bitter, … cake, tart has
been presented as it is consistent with the gist (e.g.,
“things that are sweet”). However, it is less clear that this
gist is consistent with the solution to the corresponding
CRAT problem involving the terms heart, shop, and tooth.
Indeed, gist having to do with “love” may be more appro-
priate to the solution SWEETheart. In fact, in some cases, the
gist extracted from DRM lists may be more of a hindrance
(e.g., interfere with) than of assistance when it comes to
solving some of the CRAT problems.1
Second, Howe et al. (2010, 2011) argued that this
priming effect occurred during the encoding of the DRM
lists (i.e., at study) and not during retrieval (i.e., on the
recall test). This assumption is generally consistent with
the DRM literature that shows that critical lures tend to
be generated at encoding and not during retrieval (e.g.,
Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009; Dewhurst, Knott,
& Howe, 2011). However, there is a problem with this
latter conclusion. Speciﬁcally, Howe et al. (2010, 2011)
had shown that priming of problem solutions only
occurred when participants had falsely recalled the critical
lures during the memory test. What this means is that to
determine whether participants had falsely remembered
the critical lure, a memory test was necessary. Of course,
once a memory test is administered, it is difﬁcult to say
unambiguously that priming occurred during study
because it is equally plausible that it occurred during the
test itself.
To solve this problem, Howe et al. (2010, 2011) con-
ducted a second experiment in which no memory test
was administered. That is, participants simply studied the
DRM lists and then solved CRAT problems, effectively elim-
inating the testing confound. Given that they used the
same DRM lists and CRATs in this second experiment as
in the ﬁrst, if priming occurred during encoding then
similar percentages of false memories would be anticipated
in this second experiment, despite the absence of the
memory test, and thus similar advantages should have
been observed in CRAT solution rates and times. This is
exactly what they found. That is, CRATs that had been
primed with DRM lists were solved more frequently and
more rapidly (at rates and times commensurate with
those observed in their ﬁrst experiments) than CRATs that
had not been primed. It would seem, then, that false
memory priming of CRATs occurs at encoding and not
during retrieval tests.
Given that these robust ﬁndings are not just novel but
also have important theoretical implications, particularly
in terms of understanding the locus of false memory
effects and how they serve as primes for subsequent
problem-solving, it is imperative that they generalise to
other indices of remembering (i.e., recognition as well as
recall) and are not subject to alternative interpretations.
Unfortunately, Howe et al.’s (2010, 2011) design and
measurement changes may not provide an optimal sol-
ution to determining the locus of false memory priming
effects in problem-solving. Although the testing confound
was eliminated, Howe and colleagues were no longer able
to measure false memory strength, hence the effectiveness
of the prime, using a memory test. That is, because the
priming of problem-solving requires the false recollection
of the critical lure, some sort of memory test is needed to
conﬁrm whether false recollection has occurred for speciﬁc
primes. More importantly, eliminating the memory test
does not enable an assessment of test-induced priming
effects or for the magnitude of these effects to be con-
trasted with those found at study.
1 Because it is not clear that such models can account for reasoning-remembering dependencies observed in the false-memory, problem-solving literatures
being considered here, or at least not as easily as theories based on spreading activation mechanisms, they will not be considered further in this article.
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Because it is important to provide a clear and convin-
cing demonstration that false memories can and do have
positive consequences on human cognition, in the
current article, we resolve the problems associated with
previous research so that the demonstration and
meaning of these positive effects is not compromised by
competing interpretations. We do this by switching to a
recognition measure rather than a recall measure. Thus,
in the present research, we assigned participants to one
of three conditions: one in which priming, thus activation
of the critical lure, can occur during both study and test
(the “Study and Test” condition in which relevant DRM
lists are studied and a recognition test that includes the
critical lures is used to gather data during the test phase);
one in which priming, thus activation of the critical lure,
can only occur during the study phase (the “Study Only”
condition in which relevant DRM lists are studied but
there is no recognition test); and one in which priming,
thus activation of the critical lure, can only occur during
memory testing (the “Test Only” condition in which
CRAT-irrelevant DRM lists are studied but the recognition
test includes the CRAT-relevant critical lures).
This design has three advantages. First, it overcomes the
memory test confound, given that the “Study Only” con-
dition does not include a memory test. Second, it permits
the conditionalising of CRAT solutions into those solved
with and without false recollection of the critical lure
using the “Study and Test” condition. Third, the “Test
Only” condition provides a new condition in which we
can estimate the impact of seeing the critical lure only at
test. Consequently, this design permits an evaluation of
whether the activation of the critical lure during encoding
(“Study Only”), during retrieval (“Test Only”), or both
(“Study and Test”) is important to priming CRAT solutions.
We predicted that when false memories do occur, the
primed CRAT problems should be solved more often and
more rapidly than the unprimed CRAT problems and
than primed problems where no false recollection
occurred. Furthermore, if activation of the critical lure at
study (i.e., encoding) is the key to enhancing CRAT perform-
ance, then it is expected that the solution times and rates
will be approximately equal across the “Study and Test”
and “Study Only” conditions, but lower and slower in the
“Test Only” condition and for the unprimed CRATs. Alterna-
tively, if the presence of the critical lure at test (i.e., retrieval)
contributes to enhancing CRAT performance (where this
effect is predicted to be smaller than the effect of
priming at study), then solution times and rates are
expected to be faster and greater in the “Study and Test”
condition compared with the “Study Only” condition,
which in turn will have faster and greater solution times
and rates compared with the “Test Only” condition,
which in turn will have faster and greater solution times
and rates compared with the unprimed CRATs.
To examine these hypotheses, we conducted two
experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment, we used a subset of
some newly created and normed CRAT problems (see
Appendix A), along with their corresponding DRM lists, to
provide a “proof of concept” for false memory priming
effects using the newly devised recognition paradigm
with adult participants. In Experiment 2, we examined
the comparability of these ﬁndings to those of previous
research that had used recall rather than recognition as a
measure of false memory by using identical CRAT-DRM
pairings to Howe et al. (2011). We were also interested in
whether our recognition paradigm, like the recall one
used previously, produced similar effects in children and
adults. Therefore, we tested children (11-year-olds) and
adults (20-year-olds) using the same age-appropriate
CRATs deployed in earlier studies involving recall as the
measure of false memories (Howe et al., 2011). As in this
previous research, although adults may exhibit more
false memories than children, our central concern was
whether children’s and adults’ priming effects are similar
given problem-solving tasks equated for relative difﬁculty.
That is, we used age-appropriate CRAT problems because
we were interested in whether we could attenuate (or elim-
inate) age differences in problem-solving rates by using
age-appropriate problems. Thus, age differences in
problem difﬁculty were not, in and of themselves, of inter-
est in this study. Rather, we wondered whether false mem-
ories could serve the same priming function for children as
they do for adults when problem difﬁculty was equated
across age and whether the locus of these priming
effects were developmentally invariant.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
A total of 48 university students participated in this
experiment.
Design, materials, and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
between-participants’ conditions: “Study and Test”, where
participants studied DRM lists, were given a 30 sec distrac-
tor task (letter search), followed by a recognition test, and
ﬁnally solved CRAT problems; “Study Only”, where partici-
pants studied DRM lists, were given a ﬁller task, and then
solved CRAT problems; and “Test Only”, where participants
studied CRAT-irrelevant DRM lists, were given a 30 sec dis-
tractor task (letter search), followed by a recognition test
containing CRAT-relevant but unstudied critical lures, and
then solved CRAT problems. All participants were primed
on half the CRATs but not the other half. Both the order
of the DRM lists and CRATs were counterbalanced to elim-
inate order effects.
Ten CRATs (ARMY, BLACK, FLAG, GIRL, HEALTH, LONG,
RUBBER, SMOKE, SPIDER, and WINDOW) were selected
from normative data reported in Appendix A and were
taken from the medium difﬁculty range (between 20%
and 78% solution rate). Ten corresponding DRM lists
4 M. L. HOWE ET AL.
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were used, each of which consisted of 10 associates of the
critical lure. These lists were split into two sets of ﬁve, so
participants would be primed with half the DRM lists,
while completing all 10 of the CRATs. Each set was
balanced for solution rate difﬁculty and the DRM lists
were equated for backward associative strength.
Two recognition tests were created with items used on
these tests being condition dependent. For the “Study and
Test” condition, items consisted of the 5 critical lures from
the studied DRM lists, 5 unstudied and unrelated critical
lures, 32 true items from the studied DRM lists, 32 foils
unrelated to studied DRM lists, and 8 ﬁller items. For the
“Test Only” condition, items consisted of 5 critical lures
that were not studied but were CRAT solutions, 5 critical
lures for the irrelevant DRM lists that were studied but
were not CRAT solutions, 32 true items corresponding to
the irrelevant DRM lists, 32 foils unrelated to the studied
DRM lists and the subsequent CRAT problems, and 8 ﬁller
items. No associates to the critical lures that were CRAT sol-
utions were included, to ensure that no false memories for
these items were created at test. No recognition test was
needed for the “Study Only” condition. Instead, a ﬁller
task (a letter search task) was used that took the same
time to complete as the distractor and recognition tasks
in the other conditions.
In the “Study and Test” and “Study Only” conditions, par-
ticipants were given 5 out of the 10 DRM lists in a random-
ised order on a computer screen. Participants in the “Test
Only” condition were given ﬁve irrelevant DRM lists to
study. This was followed by a distractor task (letter search)
and the appropriate recognition test, to which the partici-
pants gave their response verbally. Participants were then
asked to complete all 10 CRATs. Participants were ﬁrst
given an example, followed by two practice CRATs, before
the test CRATs were presented. Each CRAT was presented
on a computer screen, in a randomised order, and partici-
pants were asked to provide a solution verbally. If
participants failed to correctly solve a CRAT, they were
given feedback as to the correct answer after each
problem. Solutions were timed and participants were
given amaximumof oneminute to complete each problem.
Results and discussion
Both the mean CRAT solution rates (proportion correctly
solved) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were
analyzed using separate 2 (Priming: primed vs. unprimed) ×
3(Condition: study and test vs. study only vs. test only) ana-
lyses of variance (ANOVA). For solution rates, there was a
main effect of priming, F(1, 45) = 12.00, p < .01, h2p = .21,
where themean CRAT solution rate was higher when partici-
pants were primed (M = .64, SE = .03) than when they were
not primed (M = .52, SE = .03). There was no signiﬁcant
main effect of condition [F(1, 45) = 2.53, p = .09, h2p = .10]
but there was a signiﬁcant Priming × Condition interaction,
F(2, 45) = 5.09, p = .01, h2p = .18 (see Figure 1). A simple main
effects analysis with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compari-
sons showed that there were no differences across con-
ditions for unprimed CRATs [M = .45 (SE = .06), M = .60 (SE
= .05), and M = .54 (SE = .05) for the “Study and Test”, “Study
Only”, and “Test Only” conditions, respectively) but for
primed CRATs the “Study and Test” (M = .66, SE = .05) and
“Study Only” conditions (M = .74, SE = .05), which did not
differ, were superior to the “Test Only” Condition (M = .51,
SE = .05), F(2, 45) = 4.94, p = .01, h2p = .18. For solution times,
the ANOVA revealed a main effect of priming, F(1, 45) =
16.37, p < .01, h2p = .27, where the mean CRAT solution
times were lower when participants were primed (M =
31.01 sec, SE = 1.75) than when they were not primed (M =
37.01 sec, SE = 1.66). There was no signiﬁcant main effect of
condition [F(2, 45) = 1.95, p = .15, h2p = .08] and no Priming
× Condition interaction [F(2, 45) = 1.26, p = .29, h2p = .05].
Although average false memory rates were 70%, there
were a number of cases in which participants did not
Figure 1. Mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) as a function of priming (primed vs. unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only),
with 95% conﬁdence interval error bars for Experiment 1.
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falsely recognise the critical lure when primed. To
examine whether priming in the “Study and Test” con-
dition was contingent on false recognition of the critical
lures, solution rates and times were conditionalised on
whether the participant had falsely recognised the critical
lure during testing. More speciﬁcally, the primed CRAT
problem responses were separated into those solved
with a false memory and those solved without a false
memory. Those with false memories were then compared
to those without false memories using paired t-tests. For
solution rates, the t-test was signiﬁcant, t(15) = 2.36,
p < .05, where participants who were primed and had a
false memory solved more CRATs (M = .66, SD = .32, MSE
= .08) than those who were primed and had no false
memory (M = .39, SD = .42, MSE = .10). Importantly, this
latter solution rate did not differ from unprimed CRAT sol-
ution rates. For solution times, the t-test revealed that
participants who were primed and had a false memory
solved CRATs more quickly (M = 31.45 sec, SD = 14.65,
MSE = 3.66) than those who were primed and had no
false memory (M = 43.08 sec, SD = 21.25, MSE = 5.31),
although this difference only approached signiﬁcance
(t(15) =−2.02, p = .06). Like solution rates, solution times
for those who were primed but did not falsely recognise
the critical lure did not differ from unprimed CRAT
solution times.
Together, these results are the ﬁrst to show that the
effects of false memory priming on problem-solving per-
formance are greatest when the critical lure primes are
induced during the study phase as opposed to being pre-
sented at test. That is, solution rates and solution times
were better when priming occurred in the “Study and
Test” or “Study Only” conditions relative to the “Test
Only” condition. Consistent with the general literature on
the locus of false memories, critical lures become active
during the encoding process and can serve to prime per-
formance on other tasks [“superadditive priming”
(Hancock, Hicks, & Marsh, 2003)]. In our case, this other
task involves higher cognitive processes, namely,
problem-solving. Moreover, these effects are strongest
for participants whose false memory activation is sufﬁ-
ciently strong to produce false recognition of the critical
lure during testing. Critically, however, the priming advan-
tage was no greater in the “Study and Test” condition than
in the “Study Only” condition, a ﬁnding that indicates that
the addition of a recognition test did not contribute to the
overall priming effect. Before theoretical implications of
these ﬁndings are considered, we examine whether these
ﬁndings hold across different CRAT problems and general-
ise across age.
Experiment 2
Having established false memory priming effects for adults’
creative problem-solving in this new recognition memory
paradigm, we can now turn to an experiment in which
we test the generalisability of these ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally,
we examine whether these effects extend to children by
using the same CRAT-DRM pairings that were used suc-
cessfully in a similar priming experiment (but one that
used recall, not recognition, as a measure of false
memory) with children and adults (Howe et al., 2011).
Method
Participants
Thirty-six children (M = 10.9 years, SD = .4 years; 21
females) and 36 adults (M = 20.3 years, SD = 2.3 years; 20
females) participated in the experiment. All were ﬂuent in
English. Child participants were recruited from a predomi-
nantly White, middle-class school. Prior to the experiment,
written informed consent was obtained from the adult par-
ticipants and written informed parental consent was
obtained for all child participants. In addition, the assent
of each participant was provided on the day of testing.
Design, materials, and procedure
A 2(Age: 11-year-olds vs. 20-year-olds) × 3(Condition: study
and test vs. study only vs. test only) × 2(Priming: primed vs.
unprimed) design was used, where the ﬁrst two factors
were between-participants and the latter factor was
within participant. For the 11-year-old participants, eight
CRATs were chosen from the child normative data pro-
duced by Howe et al. (2011; see Appendix B in the
current article). For the adult participants, eight CRATs
were selected from the normative data in Appendix A
and from the Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003; see Appen-
dix C in the current article) norms. In addition, 16 DRM lists
were selected for use in the “Study and Test” and “Study
Only” conditions: 8 for use with the 11-year-old participants
and 8 for use with the adult participants (see Appendixes B
and C, respectively). DRM lists were selected from Stadler,
Roediger, and McDermott (1999) as well as from the
Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (2004) norms. Each of the
16 DRM lists contained the top 10 items in backward
associative strength and was presented in descending
order of associative strength to the critical lure. The eight
DRM lists studied by the 11-year-old participants and the
eight DRM lists studied by the adult participants were ran-
domly divided into two sets of four and counterbalanced
across participants, so that all CRATs were primed an
equal number of times within each age group.
An additional eight DRM lists were selected for use in
the “Test Only” condition (see Appendixes B and C).
These eight lists were unrelated to the 16 DRM lists used
in the “Study and Test” and “Study Only” conditions, as
well as the 16 CRATs. The eight unrelated DRM lists were
chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) and the same lists were
used for both 11-year-old participants and adults (lists
were selected that were suitable for both the children
and adults).
In addition to the selected CRATs and the DRM lists, a
series of eight recognition tests were constructed. Four of
these recognition tests were used in the “Study and Test”
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condition, two of which were speciﬁc to the child partici-
pants and two of which were speciﬁc to the adult partici-
pants. The other four recognition tests were constructed
for use in the “Test Only” condition. Each recognition test
consisted of 56 items: the 4 unpresented critical lure
primes; 6 presented items from each of the 4 DRM lists
studied, 3 of which were high associates of the critical
lure and 3 of which were low associates of the critical
lure; 4 unpresented but related items, 1 for each of the 4
DRM lists studied (these were typically the 14th or the
15th item from the original DRM lists and we included
these items as a measure of false memories for weak
associates: see Nelson et al., 2004; Stadler et al., 1999);
and 24 ﬁller items, which were 3 items chosen at random
from 8 completely unrelated DRM lists, randomly selected
from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001).
All participants were tested individually in a quiet, unoc-
cupied room. As in Experiment 1, the procedure differed
depending upon the condition that the participant had
been assigned to. Participants randomly assigned to the
“Study and Test” condition received general memory
instructions that informed them that they would be verb-
ally presented with four lists, one after the other, and that
they should listen carefully to each list. Participants were
subsequently presented with one set of four DRM lists in
a randomised order. A distractor task (a letter search task)
was then administered for a period of 30 sec. Following
the distractor task was a 56-item recognition test. Finally,
participants completed a set of eight CRAT problems. Par-
ticipants were ﬁrst provided with an example CRAT fol-
lowed by a practice CRAT, which they had to solve
correctly in order to advance on to the eight test CRATs.
The example CRAT, the practice CRAT, and each of the
eight test CRATs were presented on a computer screen as
well as being read aloud by the experimenter. Participants
provided a verbal response to the CRATs. Participants had a
maximum of 60 sec to complete the practice CRAT and had
a maximum of 60 sec per each of the eight test CRATs. Any
test CRAT that was not solved within the 60 sec was classi-
ﬁed as being unsolved and participants were given feed-
back on the correct answer before advancing on to the
next test CRAT. The order of presentation of the CRATs
was randomised for each participant. Solution times were
measured from the presentation of the word problem to
the time at which the correct solution was given.
Participants randomly assigned to the “Study Only” con-
dition were also given general memory instructions to
begin; participants were informed that they would be
read aloud four word lists, one after the other, and that
they should listen carefully to each word list that was to
be presented. Participants were then presented with one
set of four DRM lists in a randomised order followed by a
distractor task for a period of 210 sec, a time that equalled
the average amount of time taken to present the 56-item
recognition test and carry out the distractor task for a
period of 30 sec, in the “Study and Test” and “Test Only”
conditions. This was done to ensure that the delay interval
between list presentation and CRAT testing was constant
across all between-participant conditions. The CRATs fol-
lowed the distractor task; the same procedure was used
here as in the “Study and Test” condition.
In the ﬁnal “Test Only” condition, the testing procedure
was equivalent to that in the “Study and Test” condition
with the sole exception of the stimuli that were presented
to the participants; the DRM lists in the “Test Only” con-
dition were completely unrelated (thus irrelevant) to the
later CRATs.
Results and discussion
In line with Experiment 1, both the mean CRAT solution
rates (proportion correctly solved) and the mean CRAT sol-
ution times (seconds) were analyzed using separate 2(Age:
11- vs. 20-year-olds) × 3(Condition: study and test vs. study
only vs. test only) × 2(Priming: primed vs. unprimed)
ANOVAs.
Solution rates
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of priming, F(1, 66) =
87.62, p < .001, h2p = .57, where solution rates were higher
for primed CRATs (M = .82, SE = .02) than unprimed CRATs
(M = .56, SE = .03). There was also a signiﬁcant main effect
of condition, F(2, 66) = 8.09, p = .001, h2p = .20, where post
hoc tests revealed that solution rates were higher in the
“Study and Test” (M = .79, SE = .04) and the “Study Only”
(M = .71, SE = .04, p > .05) conditions, which did not differ,
compared with the “Test Only” condition (M = .57, SE = .04,
p < .001 and p < .05, respectively). Furthermore, there was
a signiﬁcant main effect of age, F(1, 66) = 6.42, p < .05, h2p
= .09, where children exhibited higher solution rates for
the CRATs than the adults (M = .75, SE = .03, and M = .63,
SE = .03, respectively). This ﬁnding was unexpected given
that age-normed stimuli were used. However, although
the age effect was statistically signiﬁcant, the difference
between the children’s and adults’ solution rates was
small (.12). Furthermore, there is an obvious explanation
as to why there was an age effect in the unexpected direc-
tion; the CRATs selected for use with the children had an
average normed solution rate of 54%, whereas the CRATs
selected for usewith the adults had a lower average solution
rate of 45%. Therefore, the children’s CRATs were simply
easier to solve tobeginwith compared to the adults’CRATs.2
Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant Priming × Condition
interaction, F(2, 66) = 6.77, p < .01, h2p = .17. A simple main
effects analysis with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compari-
sons showed that the solution rates for the primed CRAT
problems were higher than the solution rates for the
unprimed CRAT problems, regardless of the condition.
2 We identiﬁed that one of the child-normed CRATs was performing at ceiling (>.80; see Table 1). This main effect of age was no longer signiﬁcant (p > .05)
when we ran analyses that controlled for this ceiling effect.
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The source of the Priming × Condition interaction was in
terms of the magnitude of these effects (see Figure 2).
The primed and unprimed solution rates in the “Study
and Test” condition were .94 (SE = .03) and .64 (SE = .05),
respectively, which was a signiﬁcant difference of .30
(p < .001). The primed and unprimed solution rates in the
“Study Only” condition were .89 (SE = .03) and .54 (SE
= .07), respectively, which was a signiﬁcant difference of
.35 (p < .001). The primed and unprimed solution rates in
the “Test Only” condition were .63 (SE = .05) and .51
(SE = .05), respectively, which was a signiﬁcant difference
of .12 (p < .01). A quantitative difference was therefore
evident between the primed CRAT solution rates and the
unprimed CRAT solution rates across the three conditions;
the difference between the primed and unprimed CRAT
solution rates for the “Study and Test” and “Study Only”
conditions was quantitatively larger (by a factor of three)
than the difference between the primed and unprimed
CRAT solution rates in the “Test Only” condition (see
Figure 2). That is, both the “Study and Test” and “Study
Only” conditions showed a 30–35% gain for primed
versus unprimed CRAT solution rates, whereas the “Test
Only” condition showed only a modest 12% gain for
primed versus unprimed CRAT solution rates. Thus,
although minor improvements in CRAT solution rates
were observed when the CRAT solution words were phys-
ically presented to the participants at test (i.e., the solution
words were included as part of the recognition test of
memory) prior to them completing the eight test CRATs,
the gains from having generated the solution words at
study, prior to completing the eight test CRATs, were three-
fold greater.
Solution times
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of priming, F(1, 66) =
70.35, p < .001, h2p = .52, where solution times were quicker
for the primed CRATs (M = 21.13 sec, SE = 1.03) compared
with the unprimed CRATs (M = 29.39 sec, SE = 1.20). In
addition, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of condition, F
(2, 66) = 12.98, p < .001, h2p = .28, and post hoc tests showed
that the solution times were quickest in the “Study and
Test” condition (M = 18.96 sec, SE = 1.74), followed by the
“Study Only” condition (M = 25.37 sec, SE = 1.74), which
both produced quicker solution times compared with the
“Test Only” condition (M = 31.45 sec, SE = 1.74). There was
no main effect of age [F(1, 66) = .26, p = .61, h2p = .00], where
the average time taken to solve a CRAT was 24.75 sec (SE =
1.42) for children and 25.77 sec (SE = 1.42) for adults.
Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant Priming × Condition
interaction, F(2, 66) = 6.51, p < .01, h2p = .17. A simple main
effects analysis with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compari-
sons showed that the solution times for the primed CRATs
were faster than the solution times for the unprimed CRATs
regardless of the condition. Again, the source of the
Priming × Condition interaction was in terms of the magni-
tude of these effects (see Figure 3). The primed and
unprimed solution times for the “Study and Test” condition
were 13.50 sec (SE = 1.21) and 24.42 sec (SE = 2.09),
respectively, which was a signiﬁcant difference of 10.92
sec (p < .001). The primed and unprimed solution times
Table 1. The mean solution rates (%) for the adult- and child-normed CRATs.
Adults Children
CRAT Mean Solution Rate (%) CRAT Mean Solution Rate (%)
BREAD 69 APPLE 50
COLD 66 COFFEE 58
FRUIT 60 FOOT 58
GOLD 63 GUN 33
LION 71 PAPER 75
NEEDLE 76 PEN 50
SUN 61 TABLE 49
SWEET 29 TREE 79
WINDOW 83a STREET 57
aAt ceiling (>80%).
Figure 2. Mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) as a function of priming (primed vs. unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only),
with 95% conﬁdence interval error bars for Experiment 2.
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for the “Study Only” condition were 20.07 sec (SE = 1.91)
and 30.68 sec (SE = 1.80), respectively, which was a signiﬁ-
cant difference of 10.61 sec (p < .001). The primed and
unprimed solution times for the “Test Only” condition
were 29.84 sec (SE = 2.10) and 33.07 sec (SE = 2.22),
respectively, which was a signiﬁcant difference of 3.23
sec (p < .05). A quantitative difference was therefore
evident between the primed CRAT solution times and
the unprimed CRAT solution times across the three con-
ditions; the difference between the primed and unprimed
CRAT solution times in the “Study and Test” and “Study
Only” conditions was quantitatively greater (by a factor
of three) than the difference between the primed and
unprimed CRAT solution times in the “Test Only” condition
(see Figure 3). That is, there was a reduction in CRAT sol-
ution times of around 11 sec for primed versus unprimed
CRATs in both the “Study and Test” and “Study Only” con-
ditions, whereas the reduction was only approximately
3 sec for primed versus unprimed CRATs in the “Test
Only” condition. Hence, although there was a slight
increment in performance (i.e., faster solution times
were produced) when participants were physically pre-
sented with the solution words on a recognition
memory test prior to them solving the eight test
CRATs, the gains from inducing the solution words at
study, prior to them completing the eight test CRATs,
were also threefold greater.
Given that the false memory rates of the participants in
the “Study and Test” condition were recorded, as in Exper-
iment 1, CRAT performance could be further conditionalised
by separating the CRATs into (a) primed CRAT problems
solved where the false memory was produced (primed/
FM), (b) primed CRAT problems solved where the false
memory was not produced (primed/No-FM), and (c) the
unprimed CRAT problems that were solved. However,
because false memory rates in the “Study and Test” con-
dition were close to ceiling for both age groups, as seen in
the analyses of the “Study and Test” condition performance
earlier, we reanalyzed the data using only nonceiling partici-
pants from the “Study and Test” condition.
There were two important outcomes concerning these
reanalyses. First, the same pattern of results was obtained
when only nonceiling participants were included in the
analyses already reported. Second, when we conditiona-
lised CRAT performance on the basis of false recognition
rates for the “Study and Test” participants’ solution rates,
there was a signiﬁcant main effect for priming, F(2, 20) =
5.09, p < .02, h2p = .46. Post hoc tests (p < .05) showed that
those who were primed and falsely recognised the critical
lure solved more CRATs (M = .93, SD = .08, MSE = .02) than
those who were primed and did not falsely recognise the
critical lure (M = .50, SD = .38, MSE = .07).
General discussion
Clearly, false memories like true memories can have posi-
tive consequences when it comes to children’s and
adults’ cognitive processes. The present research provides
a convincing demonstration that false memories can serve
as effective primes when children and adults are attempt-
ing to solve problems, particularly ones that require
insight-based solutions. Thus, that false memories are an
aspect of a ﬂexible, reconstructive memory system does
not necessarily mean that the consequences of memory
illusions are negative. Indeed, as shown here, depending
on the context in which false memories occur, they can
Figure 3.Mean CRAT solution times (seconds) as a function of priming (primed vs. unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only), with
95% conﬁdence interval error bars for Experiment 2.
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and do exert a very positive inﬂuence on human cognition
(cf. Howe, 2011; Schacter et al., 2011).
Equally important, the ﬁndings that have emerged from
the present research allow us to “drill down” into some of
the mechanisms that are responsible for these positive
effects of false memories. Speciﬁcally, these results estab-
lish that the effects of priming on problem-solving per-
formance are greatest when the critical lure primes are
induced during the study phase as opposed to being pre-
sented at test. Across both experiments, these priming
effects were robust and their encoding locus consistent
with our predictions. Moreover, this research is the ﬁrst
to generalise previous ﬁndings where recall measures
were used to evaluate memory performance (Howe et al.,
2010, 2011) to memory measures involving tests of recog-
nition. Indeed, regardless of the memory measure being
used, priming insight-based problem solutions, either
through the prior presentation of DRM lists whose critical
lures are also the solutions to the subsequent problems,
or through the inclusion of critical lure primes on a recog-
nition test of memory, signiﬁcantly increases solution rates
and quickens solution times relative to unprimed problem
solution rates and times. This adds to the growing consen-
sus that false memories, like true memories, can success-
fully prime higher cognitive processes, at least in terms
of problems involving insight-based solutions.
Moreover, our research has clearly shown that false
memory priming effects are developmentally invariant.
We demonstrated this in two ways. First, priming effects
were equally robust in both child and adult populations.
That is, when age-appropriate materials were used, the
magnitudes of these priming effects were similar in chil-
dren and in adults. Second, the locus of these priming
effects did not differ with age with the bulk of these
effects occurring at encoding. This developmental invar-
iance is important theoretically. That is, our results demon-
strate that despite well-known age differences in true and
false memory rates (where children routinely produce
fewer true and false memories than adults—see Brainerd
et al., 2011; Howe et al., 2009), once a false memory is pro-
duced, it can have the same facilitating effect on sub-
sequent problem-solving regardless of age. Thus, the
same spreading activation mechanism may drive reason-
ing-remembering dependencies in children as it does in
adults.
At a more ﬁne-grained level, the outcomes of the
present research support the predictions that primed
CRATs would be solved more frequently and at a faster
rate than unprimed CRATs. Furthermore, it was hypoth-
esised that if encoding was the primary site of priming
CRAT performance, then the solution times and rates
would be reasonably equal across the “Study and Test”
and “Study Only” conditions, which in turn would be
superior to the solution times and rates generated by par-
ticipants in the “Test Only” condition and to the solution
times and rates generated in response to the unprimed
CRATs. The ﬁndings from the present research conﬁrmed
these predictions. Moreover, the difference between the
solution times and rates for primed versus unprimed
CRATs was considerably greater for both children and
adults in Experiment 2 in the “Study and Test” and
“Study Only” conditions compared to the “Test Only” con-
dition. What this means is that the generation of critical
lures during DRM list presentation (i.e., at encoding) is
more effective at priming subsequent CRAT problems
than explicitly presenting participants with the critical
lure primes during a recognition test of memory (i.e., at
retrieval). Consequently, the ﬁndings that have emerged
from the present study show that priming at study is the
key to facilitating CRAT performance, as opposed to
priming at test.
The critical readermight come to the conclusion that the
interpretation of the results from Experiments 1 and 2 is not
as straightforward aswe contend. Such readersmight argue
that both these experiments suffer from a potential con-
found. Speciﬁcally, perhaps the different conditions used
to dissever the locus of priming effects were confounded
with differential levels of exposure to potential primes. For
example, the “Study and Test” condition might prime
CRATs the most simply because participants were
exposed to more priming items during the procedure.
That is, participants in this condition were exposed to the
10-item DRM list (where each list item could be considered
aweak prime) as well as a subset of these items again on the
recognition test and the critical lure. In addition, the “Study
Only” condition might prime CRATs better than the “Test
Only” condition simply due to the fact that participants in
the former condition were exposed to the 10 weak primes
at encoding (the items on the each CRAT-relevant DRM
list) but participants in the latter condition were only
exposed to a subset of those items (and the critical lure)
during testing. According to this argument, any condition-
wise differences in priming could be due to the stage at
which priming took place (encoding vs. retrieval), the
amount of exposure to items directly and indirectly
related to the CRAT solutions, or both.
The problem with this “pure exposure” argument is that
it reduces to one about the role of testing. Speciﬁcally,
because participants in both the “Study and Test” and
“Study Only” conditions were exposed to the same 10-
item DRM lists during encoding, the only other exposure
differences must be localised at test. Whereas participants
in the “Study Only” condition received no additional
exposure to the CRAT-relevant critical lure or the related
DRM list items, participants in the “Study and Test” con-
dition, like those in the “Test Only” condition, were
exposed to a subset of those list items on the recognition
test as well as the critical lure. What is clear from the data is
that mere exposure to these additional items during a rec-
ognition test (the “Study and Test” condition) did not
enhance priming levels above that of exposure during
“Study Only”. Although there was some evidence of
priming effects in the “Test Only” condition, the effects
due to exposure at study swamped any effects observed
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from exposure at testing. Consistent with these ﬁndings is
other recent evidence showing that effects of tests (i.e.,
test-induced priming) are small relative to the effects of
study when it comes to false memory generation, for
both children (Dewhurst, Howe, Berry, & Knott, 2012) and
adults (Dewhurst et al., 2011). Overall, then, it would
seem that any potential confound between locus of
exposure (study vs. test) and amount of exposure does
not pose a serious problem and is not, therefore, a
source of concern when it comes to interpreting the out-
comes of these experiments. Indeed, it would seem safe
to conclude that like the generation of false memories
themselves, the primary locus of false memory priming
effects lies at encoding, not retrieval.
More generally, we would argue that these priming
effects, like most priming effects, occur relatively automati-
cally outside of conscious awareness. However, it is always
possible that participants may have used a more explicit
strategy when solving CRATs. That is, despite presenting
the memory and reasoning tasks to participants as being
unrelated, there is a possibility that some of the partici-
pants ﬁgured out that the tasks were connected. If partici-
pants did become aware of this relationship, such
awareness could have inﬂuenced how they went about
solving the CRATs—that is, they would be more likely to
try to remember previously presented items from the
study or test sessions to solve them. Of course, this strategy
would greatly beneﬁt the “Study and Test” and “Study
Only” conditions because those lists had many items
related to the critical lure that could enhance the likelihood
of the lure itself being remembered. In the “Test Only” con-
dition, participants may also become aware of the fact that
the solutions to the CRATs were linked to the items they
were tested on but these would be harder to access
because there would be fewer related cues. Moreover, an
explicit memory search strategy of this nature would
both increase accessibility for studied/tested words and
critical lures as CRAT solutions while at the same time
make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd the solution for unprimed items
because no matter how hard they search memory for the
previous study items, the answer is not in episodic
memory for the previously studied materials.
Although the use of such a deliberate strategy is perhaps
less likely in children than adults, we believe that this expla-
nation cannot account for these effects more generally for
at least two reasons. First, care was taken to ensure that par-
ticipants did not believe that the memory task and CRATs
were related. The study title, description, and instructions
to participants explicitly stated that the two tasks were sep-
arate and not associated, but rather, that researchers were
interested in individual differences in performance on
different memory and problem-solving tasks. In addition,
participants in the “Study Only” condition were told that
they would be given a memory test for the studied lists
after they had completed the CRATs. This was done in
order to avoid demand characteristics in this condition
(such demand characteristics were not a concern for
participants in the other conditions because they were
given a memory test before the CRATs).
Second, all participants were debriefed following the
experiment. One of the questions asked was whether
they were aware of any link between the memory and
problem-solving tasks. A relatively large percentage
(90%) said that they were not aware of any link between
the two tasks. Interestingly, when the data from the 10%
of participants who claimed to be aware of a link
between the two tasks was removed from the analyses,
we found no signiﬁcant changes in the results.
Having ruled out a deliberate memory search interpret-
ation of our results, we believe that the more parsimonious
interpretation of this set of ﬁndings lies in an automatic
priming process, one that is linked tomodels that incorporate
a spreading activationmechanismwhen explaining perform-
ance in associative memory and insight-based reasoning
tasks. Indeed, our results are consistent with the associative-
activation theory of Howe et al. (2009) as well as the acti-
vation-monitoring theory presented by Roediger andMcDer-
mott (1995). At the core of these models is the assumption
that falsememory illusions are driven by spreading activation
processes that occur during study. That faster solution times
and higher solution rates were produced by participants in
the “Study and Test” and “Study Only” conditions is predicted
because the spread of activation that results from inducing
the critical lure primes at study is believed to be far greater
than the spread of activation that results frompresenting par-
ticipants with such items at test (Dewhurst et al., 2009, 2011,
2012; Hancock et al., 2003). The notion that encoding pro-
cesses that appear to be the key to facilitating CRAT perform-
ance is also compatible with ﬁndings from previous studies
that have investigated whether associations at study or at
test drive false memory illusions (e.g., Arndt & Reder, 2003;
Dewhurst et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; McCabe, Presmanes,
Robertson, & Smith, 2004; Roediger, Balota, et al., 2001; Roe-
diger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). The
general consensus that emerged from such researchwas that
false memory illusions (e.g., those produced by DRM tasks)
were the result of associations activated during study
rather than test. Additional research (e.g., Coane & McBride,
2006; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Marsh & Dolan, 2007) has
shown that processes that occur at retrieval rarely inﬂuence
false memories. The current ﬁndings add further support to
the notion that associations generated during study as
opposed to test facilitate false memory illusions.
Although we have focused on effects at encoding it is
important to acknowledge that there were some effects
at test. Although these were small, presenting participants
with the critical lures on a recognition test prior to them
completing test CRATs did increase solution rates and
decrease solution times. These modest changes in
problem-solving performance were anticipated because
recognition tests prompt participants to search through
their memories in order to ascertain whether the presented
items are new or previously encountered items. Because
such memory searches lead to activation of the
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corresponding memory representations of the items on
the recognition test (which in the present study included
the critical lure primes), such residual activation from test
trials is likely to have some priming effect on CRAT solution
rates and times. However, as discussed previously, the
spread of activation that results from having encountered
an item at test is thought to be less powerful than the
spread of activation that results from activating an item
at study. Hence, an effect at test, although expected, was
predicted to be (and was) much weaker compared to the
effects seen at study (see Howe et al., 2009).
The outcomes presented in this article have some impor-
tant implications. First, false memories have to be sufﬁ-
ciently activated in memory that they can be successfully
recalled (Howe et al., 2010, 2011) or recognised (Exper-
iments 1–2) in order for priming to be effective. Importantly,
the current experiments clearly showed that activation
during encoding can and does facilitate immediate per-
formance on other, non-memory tasks. Second, false mem-
ories can effectively prime higher cognitive processes,
speciﬁcally insight-based, creative problem-solving, across
age (i.e., in 11-year-old children and adults). That is, false
memory primes can increase both the speed and the rate
at which problems are solved compared with unprimed
problem solutions for both children and adults. This holds
not just for false memories, but also for memories activated
by the presentation of the prime during encoding. Thus,
regardless of age, when developmentally appropriate
materials are used, false memories generated from infor-
mation presented during encoding can and do facilitate
performance on other, non-memory cognitive tasks.
Third, given that we used recognition measures to
assess false recollection, whereas previous research in
this domain used recall measures, the present study
extends priming effect ﬁndings to tests of recognition.
Thus, developmentally invariant priming effects are
observed across the two principal procedures used to
measure memory. Fourth, this research is the ﬁrst to estab-
lish that priming during the study, but not the test, phase is
key to facilitating CRAT performance. This ﬁnding compli-
ments the existing false memory priming effects literature
that has routinely shown that false memory illusions are
predominantly driven by spreading activation processes
that occur during study (i.e., encoding—see, Dewhurst
et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Howe et al., 2009).
Fifth, both the current ﬁndings and those from previous
studies (Howe et al., 2010, 2011) have extended the range of
false memory priming effects by demonstrating that false
memories can prime complex, higher order tasks and not
simply other, related implicit and explicit memory tasks.
Such results have considerable relevance to contemporary
debates regarding the links between remembering and
reasoning and the possibility of developing a uniﬁed
model of memory and reasoning processes. One salient
debate concerns the status of implicit processes such as
intuition in reasoning and problem-solving. Some theorists
(e.g., Evans, 2010) suggest that intuition may often be a
“false friend”, providing rapid, low-effort, default responses
that are in fact erroneous. This negative view can be con-
trasted with a more positive position, whereby implicit
forms of processing involving mechanisms such as
priming can give rise to intuitions that promote successful
reasoning and judgment (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007; Kahneman
& Klein, 2009). This latter position concurs with the proposal
that decisions in the face of complex problems are better
left to the cognitive unconscious—the so-called “delibera-
tion-without-attention” hypotheses (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.,
2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). This hypothesis is
not without controversy (e.g., see Acker, 2008; Aczel,
Lukacs, Komlos, & Aitken, 2011; Ambady, 2010; Lassiter,
Lindberg, González-Vallejo, Bellezza, & Phillips, 2009), with
some reporting that conscious thought may still be better
than unconscious processes (e.g., Huizenga, Wetzels, van
Ravenzwaaij, & Wagenmakers, 2012) and that there may
be some issues concerning key arguments surrounding
the roles of explicit versus implicit memory in producing
advantages from supposedly intuitive processing. Regard-
less, we believe that our ﬁndings regarding false memory
priming of problem-solving usefully inform this controversy,
revealing the beneﬁcial effects of implicitly derived false
memories for effective reasoning with complex insight
tasks and extending previous research that has revealed
beneﬁcial priming of problem-solving via true memories
(e.g., Kokinov, 1990; Schunn & Dunbar, 1996).
In conclusion, the present research has focused on the
positive consequences of false memory illusions. It is
clear that false memories like false beliefs (e.g., McKay &
Dennett, 2009) can and do exert beneﬁcial effects upon
human cognition, not only in terms of related memory
tasks but also when it comes to complex problem-solving
(Howe et al., 2010, 2011; McDermott, 1997; McKone &
Murphy, 2000). Moreover, and perhaps of greater conse-
quence, priming during encoding facilitates subsequent
problem-solving performance more so than when
priming occurs only at test. That these effects are develop-
mentally invariant when age-appropriate materials are
used is also important because it indicates that for both
children and adults, when concepts are present in a partici-
pant’s knowledge base, spreading activation mechanisms
support the formation of spontaneous false memories as
well as the more creative process of solving insight-
based problems. Hence, memory illusions, like memory
accuracies, can and do have ﬁtness-relevant adaptive con-
sequences regardless of age.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix, we report a normative study in which we
created a new set of CRAT problems speciﬁcally for adults.
We did this so we could better control CRAT difﬁculty and
use a wider variety of DRM lists than those already available
in previously normedCRATs (Bowden& Jung-Beeman, 2003).
A total of 40 university students participated in this nor-
mative experiment. Participants were presented with 32
CRATs (see Table A1). The items on the CRATs all required
a solution that was a word associated with all three words
of the triad through the construction of a compound word
or common phrase (e.g., glasses, ﬂower, and burn, are
associated by the common, solution word SUN: SUNglasses,
SUNﬂower, and SUNburn). Twenty-nine of the CRATs were
newly created such that their solutions were also critical
lures found in the Roediger, Watson et al. (2001) DRM
lists. The three additional problems whose solutions were
also critical lures on DRM lists were taken from the original
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) norms.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.
Instructions similar to Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003)
were given. That is, participants were told that they would
see three items on a computer screen and that they should
try and produce a fourth word, which, when combined with
eachof the three items,wouldmakeupacommoncompound
word or phrase. Participants were ﬁrst given three demon-
strations by the experimenter followed by two practice pro-
blems prior to the experiment itself. The three problem
words were presented on a computer laptop screen simul-
taneously in a vertical orientation, one above, below, and at
the centre point. The participants were given 60 sec (the
longest time limit used by Bowden and Jung-Beeman was
30 sec) to produce the solution. If the solution was produced
within the time limit, both the solution and the solution time
were recordedand thenextproblemwaspresented. If thepar-
ticipant did not produce the correct response within the time
limit, the solution was provided by the experimenter and the
program automatically moved on to the next problem.
We present the results for both solution rates and
solution times in Table A1.
Table A1. New CRAT norms for adults.
CRAT problem Solution/critical lure % Solved Solution time
Crust/stale/french Bread 93 10.81 (14.86)
Chase/police/toy Car 90 16.48 (19.23)
Old/hole/super Man 88 24.48 (19.14)
Note/jazz/sheet Music 88 15.21 (18.70)
Post/lava/bulb Lamp 85 18.67 (21.25)
Knitting/pine/work Needle 85 18.23 (21.29)
Salad/bowl/juice Fruit 83 22.83 (20.52)
Haul/jump/bow Long 78 26.49 (23.99)
Band/ball/tyre Rubber 73 26.61 (24.20)
Spa/mental/care Health 68 28.84 (24.46)
Shop/washer/frame Window 60 31.49 (24.82)
Board/mail/magic Black 58 33.71 (25.41)
Base/territorial/boot Army 55 37.64 (23.68)
Pole/national/ship Flag 55 32.32 (25.73)
Flower/friend/scout Girl 55 38.56 (21.37)
Leg/wheel/high Chair 53 35.05 (24.89)
Knife/tip/pal Pen 50 38.10 (24.00)
Drinking/tea/cake Cup 48 39.39 (23.43)
Football/ﬂannel/vest Shirt 48 41.27 (22.97)
School/chair/horse High 43 40.59 (25.23)
Bank/boat/winding River 40 40.96 (23.92)
Cleaner/magic/woven Carpet 33 48.89 (18.73)
Skin/tissue/ball Soft 33 46.80 (20.39)
Stop/wolf/dog Whistle 30 47.34 (21.33)
Bomb/white/alarm Smoke 25 50.42 (18.08)
Tooth/potato/heart Sweet 25 48.75 (20.42)
List/bone/last Wish 25 47.35 (22.76)
Hold/stool/print Foot 23 50.63 (19.78)
Limits/sights/break City 20 51.42 (18.13)
Walk/over/deep Sleep 18 52.87 (17.20)
Monkey/bite/legs Spider 18 53.20 (16.90)
Cheese/pie/ivy Cottage 15 53.12 (17.70)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Appendix B
The stimuli selected for use with the 11-year-old partici-
pants in Experiment 2: the eight DRM lists chosen from
Stadler et al. (1999) and from the normed associates lists
created by Nelson et al. (2004), for use in the “Study and
Test” and “Study Only” conditions (the critical lure has
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been underlined); the eight corresponding CRAT problems
selected from the child normative data produced by Howe
et al. (2011) for use in all three test conditions (the solution
word has been underlined and is synonymous to the criti-
cal lure of the corresponding DRM list); the eight unrelated
DRM lists chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) for use in the
“Test Only” condition.
Bread
DRM list: butter, sandwich, jam, milk, ﬂour, jelly, dough,
crust, loaf, toast.
CRAT problem: crumb, knife, stale.
Cold
DRM list: hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, chilly, weather,
freeze, shiver.
CRAT problem: water, sore, temperature.
Fruit
DRM list: vegetable, citrus, basket, strawberry, kiwi, plum,
grape, cherry, lemon, peach.
CRAT problem: juice, salad, bowl.
Gold
DRM list: silver, jewellery, bronze, bracelet, necklace, medal,
treasure, brass, metal, shiny.
CRAT problem: ﬁsh, mine, ring.
Lion
DRM list: tiger, roar, ﬁerce, mane, jungle, zoo, hunt, Africa,
feline, cat.
CRAT problem: cub, sea, king.
Needle
DRM list: thread, pin, syringe, sharp, point, thimble, thorn,
hurt, injection, cloth.
CRAT problem: sewing, pine, knitting.
Sweet
DRM list: sour, sugar, bitter, nice, taste, soda, honey, choco-
late, cake, tart.
CRAT problem: heart, shop, tooth.
Window
DRM list: door, glass, pane, curtains, house, sill, open,
shutter, view, clear.
CRAT problem: frame, cleaner, ledge.
Black
DRM list: white, dark, cat, charred, night, colour, blue, ink,
coal, gray.
Car
DRM list: truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, race, keys,
garage, van.
Doctor
DRM list: nurse, sick, medicine, health, hospital, ill, ofﬁce,
stethoscope, surgeon, clinic.
Music
DRM list: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody,
concert, instrument, orchestra.
River
DRM list: water, stream, lake, boat, tide, swim, ﬂow, barge,
creek, brook.
Sleep
DRM list: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, blanket,
snore, nap, yawn.
Smell
DRM list: nose, breathe, sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril,
scent, fragrance, perfume.
Spider
DRM list: web, insect, bug, fright, ﬂy, crawl, tarantula,
poison, bite, creepy.
Appendix C
The stimuli selected for use with the adult participants in
Experiment 2: the eight DRM lists chosen from Stadler
et al. (1999) and from the normed associates lists created
by Nelson et al. (2004), for use in the “Study and Test” and
“Study Only” conditions (the critical lure has been under-
lined); the eight corresponding CRAT problems selected
from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) for use in all three
test conditions (the solution word has been underlined
and is synonymous to the critical lure of the corresponding
DRM list); the eight unrelated DRM lists chosen from
Stadler et al. (1999) for use in the “Test Only” condition.
Apple
DRM list: core, orchard, pear, pie, fruit, banana, rotten,
Newton, cobbler, orange.
CRAT problem: pine, crab, sauce.
Coffee
DRM list: caffeine, tea, café, drip, cup, grind, mug, cream,
doughnut, instant.
CRAT problem: break, bean, cake.
Foot
DRM list: walk, hand, toe, kick, sandals, yard, ankle, boot,
inch, sock.
CRAT problem: hold, print, stool.
Gun
DRM list: pistol, trigger, weapon, bullet, riﬂe, shoot, shoot-
ing, shot, bang, hunting.
CRAT problem: ﬁght, control, machine.
Paper
DRM list: newsstand, sheet, document, pad, folder, margin,
thesis, tissue, staple, notebook.
CRAT problem: ﬂy, clip, wall.
Pen
DRM list: pencil, write, fountain, quill, felt, Bic, scribble,
cross, tip, marker.
CRAT problem: knife, light, pal.
Street
DRM list: avenue, boulevard, road, sidewalk, alley, curb,
lane, crossing, corner, pavement.
CRAT problem: main, sweeper, light.
Tree
DRM list: oak, sap, stump, leaf, bush, forest, elm, branch,
leaves, moss.
CRAT problem: palm, shoe, house.
Black
DRM list: white, dark, cat, charred, night, colour, blue, ink,
coal, gray.
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Car
DRM list: truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, race, keys,
garage, van.
Doctor
DRM list: nurse, sick, medicine, health, hospital, ill, ofﬁce,
stethoscope, surgeon, clinic.
Music
DRM list: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody,
concert, instrument, orchestra.
River
DRM list: water, stream, lake, boat, tide, swim, ﬂow, barge,
creek, brook.
Sleep
DRM list: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, blanket,
snore, nap, yawn.
Smell
DRM list: nose, breathe, sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril,
scent, fragrance, perfume.
Spider
DRM list: web, insect, bug, fright, ﬂy, crawl, tarantula,
poison, bite, creepy.
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